Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/121317 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 24-2015
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking for advice, alters the expert's perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.
Schlagwörter: 
reputation
cheap talk
safe haven
JEL: 
D82
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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