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Palek, Jakob
Schwanebeck, Benjamin
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 22-2015
The financial crisis proved strikingly that stabilizing the price level is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure macroeconomic stability. The obvious candidate for addressing systemic risk is macroprudential policy. In this paper we study the optimal monetary and macroprudential policy mix in a currency union in the case of different kinds of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The monetary and macroprudential instruments are modelled as independent tools. With a union-wide macroprudential tool, full absorption on the aggregate level is possible, but welfare losses due to fluctuations in relative variables prevail. With country-specific macroprudential tools, full absorption of shocks is always possible. But it is only optimal as long as there is no inefficient labor allocation. Comparing different policy regimes, we get the following ranking in terms of welfare: discretion outperforms strict inflation targeting which outperforms a (euro-area based) Taylor Rule.
financial frictions
credit spreads
borrowing constraint
monetary policy
macroprudential policy
optimal policy mix
currency union
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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