Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/115116
Authors: 
Paetzold, Jörg
Winner, Hannes
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State 1411
Abstract: 
We provide first field evidence on evasion spillovers as an important determinant of the individual compliance decision. Exploiting discontinuities in a self-reported commuter tax allowance, we observe a substantial share of taxpayers misreporting their claims. Using exogenous variation in job changes we find that individual evasion decisions are in uenced by the compliance behavior of other co-workers, with job changers from low- to high-cheating companies starting to evade much more after they move. In contrast, movers from high- to low-cheating companies do not alter their reporting. The most likely explanation is information transmission, including increased knowledge about the possibilities for non-compliance.
Subjects: 
Tax Evasion
Self-Reporting
Spillover Effects
Information Frictions
JEL: 
H24
H26
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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