Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/115020
Authors: 
Lalive, Rafael
Wuellrich, Jean-Philippe
Zweimüller, Josef
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
NRN Working Paper, NRN: The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State 0911
Abstract: 
We study the impact of employment quota on firms' demand for disabled workers. The Austrian Disabled Persons Employment Act (DPEA) requires firms to provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 non-disabled workers, a rule which is strictly enforced by non-compliance taxation. We find that, as a result of the discontinuous nature of the noncompliance tax, firms exactly at the quota threshold employ 0.05 (20 % in relative terms) more disabled workers than firms just below the threshold { an effect that is unlikely driven by purposeful selection below the threshold. The flat rate nature of the non-compliance tax generates strong employment effects for low-wage firms and weak effects for high-wage firms. We also find that growing firms passing the quota threshold react with a substantial time-lag but the magnitude of the long-run effect is similar to the one found in cross-section contrasts.
Subjects: 
disability
discrimination
employment
employment quota
regression discontinuity
JEL: 
J15
J20
J71
J78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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