Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113200
Authors: 
Schöttner, Anja
Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Labor Experiments G17-V4
Abstract: 
Incentives for managers are often provided by offering them performance-based compensation schemes. The efficiency of such monetary compensations, however, depends on several factors, among them the quality of the employed performance measures, the information available for contracting purposes, and the allocation of decision-making authority which translates into either more centralized or more decentralized organizational structures. This article investigates a firm's decision whether to delegate or retain the authority to decide on a specific job design in a moral hazard environment with asymmetric information on effort costs. It provides conditions under which decentralization is the preferred organizational form. Moreover, it derives the result that the relation between incentives and the delegation of decision-making authority is not univocal, but depends on the quality of the employed performance measure. In this regard, it contributes to explaining the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between incentives and decision-rights.
JEL: 
M52
M55
M21
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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