Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113185
Authors: 
Meran, Georg
Schwarze, Reimund
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Environmental Economics V E13-V1
Abstract: 
This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol-Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-a-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and deliberate defaulting of subpopulations. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments and pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of abatement. Moreover we prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimise the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.
JEL: 
H23
Q58
L51
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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