Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113041
Authors: 
Szech, Nora
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Auctions F12-V2
Abstract: 
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in a market are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information in these markets affects welfare and revenues is of fundamental interest. We introduce new mathematical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for markets with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by release of information, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.
JEL: 
D44
D82
D47
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.