Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112939
Authors: 
Grimm, Veronika
Feicht, Robert
Rau, Holger
Stephan, Gesine
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Behavior in groups C22-V2
Abstract: 
We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and six recipients that are divided into two groups of three. The proposer cannot discriminate among, but across group members. Acceptance decisions are taken by a committee of three representatives from one or both groups. In a 2x2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii), proposals are more balanced if both groups have veto power (iii) acceptance rates are only high when the environment gives a clear idea of what an appropriate proposal is. Non--binding communication reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.
JEL: 
C92
C78
C91
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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