Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Siassi, Nawid
Dolado, Juan J.
Lalé, Etienne
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Public Economics - Theory I No. B14-V2
This paper analyzes the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a dual labour market. We compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at long tenure, and another with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialize the discussion of such choices to Spain. A SOEC has the potential of bringing big time efficiency and welfare gains in a steady-state sense. We also identify winners and losers in the transitional path of such a reform and analyze its political support.
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.