Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112806
Authors: 
Frommeyer, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Political Economy II B21-V2
Abstract: 
We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members, who possess private information about the state of the world, have to make a binary decision. We investigate incentives for truthful revelation of their information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000 shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their preferences are homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that heterogeneous committees have strictly higher incentives to reveal information and can be strictly better off if the straw poll allows for an earlier decision for high level of consensus.
JEL: 
D72
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.