Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108957
Authors: 
Tovar-García, Edgar Demetrio
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Latin American Economic Review [ISSN:] 2196-436X [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 23 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 1-33
Abstract: 
This paper studies the mechanisms of market discipline in the Mexican deposit market. It tests the hypothesis that low-quality banks pay higher interest rates on deposits, receive fewer deposits, and shift their deposit agreements from long to short term. This hypothesis was assessed with positive evidence in Mexico during the period 1991 - 1996, but was not checked again. This research uses a dynamic panel model and a sample of 37 banks from December 2008 to September 2012 to re-evaluate the market discipline hypothesis. The findings suggest a weak presence of discipline induced by depositors. Principally, market discipline is absent within market sectors.
Subjects: 
Market discipline
Deposit market
Bank risk
Mexico
JEL: 
E59
G21
G39
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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