Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108571
Authors: 
Gurdal, Mehmet Y.
Ozdogan, Ayca
Saglam, Ismail
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series 1123
Abstract: 
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.
Subjects: 
Strategic information transmission
truth-telling
trust, sender-receiver game
JEL: 
C72
C90
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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