Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108512
Authors: 
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 181
Abstract: 
We investigate how third-party punishers and potential violators decide under evidentiary uncertainty in a take game. In line with the legal requirement and in contrast to economic models, neither the sanction nor the harm level affects the punishment probability, but the quality of evidence does have an impact. Potential violators' decisions are strongly influenced by the expected punishment probability but not by the level of the sanction.
Subjects: 
experiment
standard of proof
third-party punishment
JEL: 
K42
D81
C91
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-180-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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