Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/106479
Authors: 
Bischoff, Ivo
Ihtiyar, Özcan
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 03-2015
Abstract: 
We conduct an experiment on the impact of feedback in the Trust Game. In our treatment group, the Trustee has the opportunity to give feedback to the Investor (free in choice of wording and contents). The feedback option is found to reduce the share of Investors who sent no resources to the Trustee, while the impact on average behavior is less pronounced. The notion proposed by Xiao and Houser (2005, PNAS) according to which verbal feedback and monetary sanctions are substitutes is not supported. We use the PANAS-scale (Mackinnon et al., 1999) to capture change in subjects' short-run affective state during the experiment. Receiving feedback has an impact on the Investors' short-run affective state but giving feedback is not found to have an effect on Trustees' short-run affective state.
Subjects: 
Trust Game
Feedback
Short-run affect
Emotions
JEL: 
C91
D03
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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