Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104574
Authors: 
Becker, Nicole
Häger, Kirsten
Heufer, Jan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-042
Abstract: 
We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a "social planner" or a "veil of ignorance" experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion paper by Becker, Häger, and Heufer (BHH, 2013), in which we introduce a "notion of distributive justice" by which individuals trade off equality and efficiency. The purpose of the theoretical framework is to explain preferences in dictator experiments by a combination of selfishness and concerns for distributive justice. Most participants conform very well with the Agreement and Symmetry axioms proposed in BHH; we find that for 80% of participants the evidence is very strong. The experiment therefore demonstrates that most participants' behaviour in dictator experiments can be explained by a combination of selfishness and concerns for distributive justice. We also provide a rough classification of preferences and notions of distributive justice and show that participants' strength of the sense for justice (Karni and Safra 2002b) can be compared non- parametrically.
Subjects: 
altruism
dictator games
distributive justice
experimental economics
non-parametric analysis
preference decomposition
revealed preference
social preferences
JEL: 
C14
C91
D11
D12
D63
D64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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