Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104212 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2006-32
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates from a sequence of eBay auctions. First the aspect of bidding in a marketplace environment is developed. Form the simple dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with a "reservation bid" for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a similar two-stage procedure as has recently been used when estimating dynamic games it is shown that bidding costs are non-parametrically identified. The procedure is tried on a new data set. The median cost is estimated at less than 2% of transaction prices.
Subjects: 
search models
auctions
eBay
Internet auctions
econometrics of auctions
bidding costs
identification
JEL: 
C23
C51
D44
D82
D83
L10
L81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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