Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/87690 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper No. 2013/15
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the impact of stock exchange trading rules and surveillance on the frequency and severity of suspected insider trading cases in 22 stock exchanges around the world over the period January 2003 through June 2011. Using new indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker-agency conflict based on the specific provisions of the trading rules of each stock exchange, along with surveillance to detect non-compliance with such rules, we show that more detailed exchange trading rules and surveillance over time and across markets significantly reduce the number of cases, but increase the profits per case.
Schlagwörter: 
Insider trading
Surveillance
Exchange Trading Rules
Law and Finance
JEL: 
G12
G14
G18
K22
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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