Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/66313 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 1997,28
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care for sales in addition to profits. Whereas strategic delegation does not change the market results as compared to the usual duopoly solution, indirect evolution causes a more competitive behavior. Thus the case at hand suffices to demonstrate the difference between the two approaches in explaining economic institutions.
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
72.83 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.