Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64244 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2011-13
Verlag: 
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, Amherst, MA
Zusammenfassung: 
We address four empirical questions in this paper. Is there empirical support for: 1) the risk-incentives tradeoff predicted by agency theory? 2) a positive relationship between authority and incentives? 3) a positive relationship between risk and authority? 4) the main testable implication of Prendergast’s model, namely that the risk coefficient in an incentives regression should become smaller (i.e. less positive or more negative) when delegation of worker authority is incorporated into the riskincentives regression model? Our empirical results support affirmative answers to all four questions, though in some cases the relevant parameters are estimated with low precision. Thus, our analysis contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence clarifying the relationship between risk and incentive pay and how managers optimally bundle incentive pay and the delegation of worker decision rights to cope with risk. In particular, we attempt to reconcile the mixed nature of the empirical literature concerning evidence for a riskincentives tradeoff by empirically addressing Prendergast’s extension of the standard principal-agent model.
Schlagwörter: 
Agency Theory
Risk versus Incentives Tradeoff
Delegation of Worker Authority
Performance Pay
JEL: 
D21
D23
D81
M51
M52
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
276.62 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.