Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64177 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorCoram, Alexen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-25T07:18:07Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-25T07:18:07Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64177-
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of struggles over resources by studying a game between a producer that can guard and buy fortifications and a pirate. It is assumed that the returns from defence and raiding depends on the ratio of the resources spent on each activity and that all produced goods can be stolen. It attempts to characterise the trajectory of the resources and the defence and raiding activities of the pirate and producer. I show, among other things, that the pirate's strategy is to farm the producer and that the pirate's raiding activities and resources will decline as the productive capacity of the producer increases. I also show that a flexible guarding strategy may be preferred to fixed fortifications if the producer's resources are low at any time.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Massachusetts, Department of Economics |cAmherst, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2006-07en
dc.subject.jelC61en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelP14en
dc.subject.jelD00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordresource strugglesen
dc.subject.keywordpiracyen
dc.subject.keyworddifferential gamesen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal controlen
dc.titleAn asymmetric dynamic struggle between pirates and producers-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572997701en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ums:papers:2006-07en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
195.4 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.