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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62882
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Goyal, Sanjeev | en |
dc.contributor.author | Vega-Redondo, Fernando | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-20T13:01:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-20T13:01:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62882 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pair-wise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network formation, however, has powerful effects on individual behavior: if costs of forming links are below a certain threshold then players coordinate on the risk-dominant action, while if costs are above this threshold then they coordinate on the efficient action. These findings are robust to a variety of modifications in the link formation process. For example, it may be posited that, in order for a link to materialize, the link proposal must be two-sided (i.e. put forward by both agents); or that, in case of a unilateral proposal, the link may be refused by the other party (if, say, the latter's net payoff is negative); or that a pair of agents can play the game even if connected only through indirect links. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aQueen Mary University of London, Department of Economics |cLondon | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x481 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C7 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D6 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Networks, Links, Coordination games, Equilibrium selection, Risk dominance, Efficiency | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Netzwerk | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Koordination | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.title | Network formation and social coordination | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 377035793 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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