Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62158
Authors: 
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,18
Abstract: 
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.
Subjects: 
auctions
procurement
JEL: 
D44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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