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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Harstad, Bård | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-10-25 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-07-12T12:34:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-07-12T12:34:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59673 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. If the agents can contract on provision levels, but not on investments, they invest suboptimally little, particularly if the contract is short-term or close to its expiration date. To encourage sufficient investments, the optimal and equilibrium contract is more ambitious if it is short-lasting, and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration date. If renegotiation is possible, such a contract implements the first best. The results have important implications for how to design a climate treaty. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, IL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiscussion Paper |x1504 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H87 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q54 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F53 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | dynamic private provision of public goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | dynamic common-pool problems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | dynamic hold-up problems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incomplete contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | renegotiation design | en |
dc.subject.keyword | climate change and climate agreements | en |
dc.title | Incomplete contracts in dynamic games | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 637696034 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1504 | en |
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