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dc.contributor.authorFoote, Christopher L.en
dc.contributor.authorGerardi, Kristopher S.en
dc.contributor.authorWillen, Paul S.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-08-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-20T16:09:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-20T16:09:42Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59225-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents 12 facts about the mortgage market. The authors argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from financial industry insiders deceiving uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors. Instead, they argue that borrowers and investors made decisions that were rational and logical given their ex post overly optimistic beliefs about house prices. The authors then show that neither institutional features of the mortgage market nor financial innovations are any more likely to explain those distorted beliefs than they are to explain the Dutch tulip bubble 400 years ago. Economists should acknowledge the limits of our understanding of asset price bubbles and design policies accordingly.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPublic Policy Discussion Papers |x12-2en
dc.subject.jelD14en
dc.subject.jelD18en
dc.subject.jelD53en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG01en
dc.subject.jelG02en
dc.subject.jelG38en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleWhy did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions? The causes of the foreclosure crisis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715373455en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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