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dc.contributor.authorGerardi, Kristopheren
dc.contributor.authorLambie-Hanson, Laurenen
dc.contributor.authorWillen, Paul S.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-12-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-20T16:09:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-20T16:09:39Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59221-
dc.description.abstractThe authors evaluate laws designed to protect borrowers from foreclosure. They find that these laws delay but do not prevent foreclosures. They first compare states that require lenders to seek judicial permission to foreclose with states that do not. Borrowers in judicial states are no more likely to cure and no more likely to renegotiate their loans, but the delays lead to a buildup in these states of persistently delinquent borrowers, the vast majority of whom eventually lose their homes. They next analyze a right-to-cure law instituted in Massachusetts on May 1, 2008. Using a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the effect of the policy, they compare Massachusetts with neighboring states that did not adopt similar laws. They find that the right-to-cure law lengthens the foreclosure timeline but does not lead to better outcomes for borrowers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPublic Policy Discussion Papers |x11-9en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelK11en
dc.subject.jelR31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordforeclosureen
dc.subject.keywordmortgageen
dc.subject.keywordjudicialen
dc.subject.keywordpower of saleen
dc.subject.keywordright to cureen
dc.titleDo borrower rights improve borrower outcomes? Evidence from the foreclosure process-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn682890243en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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