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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2010,056
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a theory of vertically interrelated markets of identical fixed size under implementation of positive indirect network effects. By introducing two Salop circles, a two-sided market model is provided, where intermediaries of differentiated copyrights for intellectual property, like performing rights organizations or publishers, compete as oligopsonists for owners of the intellectual property and as oligopolists for the users of their blanket licenses. We demonstrate, that an increase in competition benefits either license users or copyright owners or harms both groups. Moreover, if license users gain from an increased market entry, the owners of the intellectual property have to incur losses and vice versa.
Schlagwörter: 
vertical restraints
indirect network effects
copyright enforcement
performing rights organizations
music industry
JEL: 
D43
L13
L44
L82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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