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Title:Effects of exclusion on social preferences PDF Logo
Authors:Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2011,053
Abstract:In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after the exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is only insignificantly reciprocated by it. Overall, we find little evidence that intentional exclusion has substantial effects on behavior.
Subjects:exclusion
bargaining
ultimatum game
social preferences
experiment
JEL:C91
J52
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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