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dc.contributor.authorEllingsen, Toreen
dc.contributor.authorÖstling, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:05:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:05:23Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56175-
dc.description.abstractWe model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior under each decision making regime for two different cognitive hierarchy models. Our results suggest that authoritarian decision making is optimal when players have conflicting preferences over the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, whereas consensual decision making is optimal when players have congruent preferences over this set. The intuition is that authoritarian decision making avoids conflict, but sometimes creates insufficient mutual trust to implement socially optimal outcomes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x634en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelL20en
dc.subject.jelM21en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOrganizational decision makingen
dc.subject.keywordcoordination gamesen
dc.subject.keywordcommunicationen
dc.subject.keywordcognitive hierarchy modelsen
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwOrganisationen
dc.subject.stwKonflikten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleOrganizational structure as the channeling of boundedly rational pre-play communication-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn518069885en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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