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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kratzsch, Uwe | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sieg, Gernot | en |
dc.contributor.author | Stegemann, Ulrike | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-07-05 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-14T17:10:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-14T17:10:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aTechnische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cBraunschweig | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aEconomics Department Working Paper Series |x11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q54 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F53 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | global warming | en |
dc.subject.keyword | international agreement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | weak renegotiation-proofness | en |
dc.subject.stw | Klimaschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Umweltabkommen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Treibhausgas | en |
dc.subject.stw | Luftverunreinigung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 663609720 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:tbswps:11 | en |
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