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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48853
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Schäfer, Andreas | en |
dc.contributor.author | Schneider, Maik T. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-08-18 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-08-23T12:49:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-08-23T12:49:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48853 | - |
dc.description.abstract | While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions' desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cLeipzig | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x96 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F10 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O10 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O30 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Endogenous Growth | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Intellectual Property Rights | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Trade | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Dynamic Game | en |
dc.subject.stw | Immaterialgüterrechte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rechtsdurchsetzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nord-Süd-Beziehungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Neue Wachstumstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Endogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growth | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 666351384 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:leiwps:96 | en |
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