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dc.contributor.authorAndersen, Torben M.en
dc.contributor.authorSvarer, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-17-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-28T13:53:56Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-28T13:53:56Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46056-
dc.description.abstractThe consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between good and bad states of nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but there may also be an incentive argument. Since benefits may be less distortionary in a recession than a boom, it follows that counter-cyclical benefits reduce average distortions compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal (utilitarian) benefits are counter-cyclical and may reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the variability of unemployment may increase.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5196en
dc.subject.jelJ6en
dc.subject.jelH3en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordunemployment benefitsen
dc.subject.keywordbusiness cycleen
dc.subject.keywordinsuranceen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwKonjunkturelle Arbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBusiness cycle dependent unemployment insurance-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn659026295en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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