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Title:Incentivierung des Managements bei Unternehmenskäufen/Buy-Outs mit Private Equity Investoren - eine empirische Untersuchung PDF Logo
Authors:Schalast, Christoph
Buxkaemper, Marius
Büchler, Christian
Wedel, Gregor
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Working paper series // Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 161
Abstract:Since years, incentives for the management have become a standard upon acquisitions of companies by Private Equity Investors - so-called Buy-Outs. However, until this date there are no empirical studies available on the arrangements of management participations and potential conflicts of interest especially on occasion of sales from one Private Equity Investor to another - so-called Secondary Buy-Outs. This present study is based on a survey among Private Equity Investors and Management Teams in companies controlled by Private Equity Investors. It shows a high degree of sensibility of all parties concerned for the issue of incentives and the potential conflict of interest involved with it. It also showed that market standards for management incentives have developed in the meantime. In practice, the instrument to prevent conflicts is therefore the transparency of the transaction. The only way to prevent criminal and civil consequences (damages) for the managers involved, as well as obstructing or even frustrating the process as a whole, is an open and transparent communication about the selling process and possible concepts of incentives between all parties concerned, i.e. seller, buyer and the management involved. Despite the frequency of such transactions there are - until today - no market standards or guide lines for this necessary transparency. The present study intends to create initial groundwork for this.
Subjects:Management Buy-Out
MBO
Management Buy-In
MBI
Leveraged Buy-Out
Private Equity
Secondary Buy-Out
Managementbeteiligung
Beteiligungsvertrag
Bad-Leaver/Good-Leaver
Interessenkonflikt
Beteiligungsquote
Garantien
Exit
Incentivierung
Reporting
Transparenz
JEL:K12
K19
K22
K29
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

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