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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43822
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Haake, Claus-Jochen | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-07-24 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-24T10:23:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-24T10:23:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7012 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43822 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefeld | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Papers |x366 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D40 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | support result | en |
dc.subject.keyword | object division | en |
dc.subject.keyword | market | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Kalai-Smorodinsky solution | en |
dc.title | Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 572499752 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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