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dc.contributor.authorJäger, Gerharden
dc.contributor.authorKoch-Metzger, Larsen
dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Franken
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:55Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-15602en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43778-
dc.description.abstractWe study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x420en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCheap talken
dc.subject.keywordSignaling gameen
dc.subject.keywordCommunication gameen
dc.subject.keywordDynamic stabilityen
dc.subject.keywordVoronoi tesselationen
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleVoronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn61689936Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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