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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dreher, Axel | en |
dc.contributor.author | Klasen, Stephan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Raymond, James | en |
dc.contributor.author | Werker, Eric | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-23 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-15T10:26:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-11-15T10:26:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41567 | - |
dc.description.abstract | As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege) |cGöttingen | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |acege Discussion Papers |x97 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O19 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F35 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | World Bank | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Aid Effectiveness | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Political Influence | en |
dc.subject.keyword | United Nations Security Council | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entwicklungshilfe | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entwicklungsfinanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entwicklungsprojekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Projektbewertung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Internationale Organisation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Internationale Sicherheit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mitgliedschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auslandsverschuldung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Welt | en |
dc.title | The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 62241495X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:cegedp:97 | en |
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