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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38868
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bierbrauer, Felix | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-09 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-18T11:11:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-18T11:11:41Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38868 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study how an optimal income tax and an optimal public-goods provision rule respond to preference and productivity shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. We therefore extend the Mirrleesian model so as to include a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main results are the following: first, the possibility of preference shocks yields a new set of collective incentive constraints. Productivity shocks have no such implication. Second, the optimal policy gives rise to a positive correlation between the public-goods provision level, the extent of redistribution and marginal tax rates. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,18 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Public Goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Optimal Taxation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Mechanism Design | en |
dc.subject.stw | Einkommensteuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Optimale Besteuerung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verteilungspolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Präferenztheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktivität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schock | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Versorgung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Optimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocks | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 627561519 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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