Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/36730 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1008
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent firm and a union when the wage contract becomes generally binding. Our main application relates to competition among operators of mail delivery networks. We describe the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' costs incentive and its consequences resulting from labor laws that make collective agreements generally binding. We show that minimum wages implemented by means of extension regulation are an effective deterrence instrument which frustrates both market entry as well as investments into the build-up of a mail delivery network.
Schlagwörter: 
Minimum wages
postal services
collective bargaining
raising rivals' costs
JEL: 
L12
J52
K31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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