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dc.contributor.authorKaas, Leoen
dc.contributor.authorMadden, Paulen
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-06-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-07T09:11:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-07T09:11:32Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/33401-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first-best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x2043en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelJ48en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordholdupen
dc.subject.keywordinvestmenten
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen
dc.subject.stwMonopolistischer Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleHoldup in oligopsonistic labour markets: a new role for the minimum wage-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn510105750en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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