Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31205
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Pai, Mallesh | en |
dc.contributor.author | Vohra, Rakesh V. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T10:18:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T10:18:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31205 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indivisible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive constrained-e±cient and revenue maximizing auctions for this setting. In general, the optimal auction requires `pooling' both at the top and in the middle despite the maintained assumption of a monotone hazard rate. Further, the auctioneer will never ¯nd it desirable to subsidize bidders with low budgets. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, IL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiscussion Paper |x1471 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | optimal auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | budget constraints | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Budgetrestriktion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 587667141 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1471 | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.