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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Calzolari, Giacomo | en |
dc.contributor.author | Pavan, Alessandro | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T10:18:11Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T10:18:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31176 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to trade. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, IL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiscussion Paper |x1405 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | information linkage between primary and secondary markets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | optimal disclosure policy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | stochastic allocations | en |
dc.subject.keyword | mechanism design. | en |
dc.subject.stw | Monopol | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Dynamisches Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unvollkommene Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Monopoly with resale | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 586193200 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1405 | en |
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