Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27255 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 731
Publisher: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Abstract: 
We consider a model of a monopolistic network operator who sequentially offers two-parted access charges to symmetric downstream firms. We are particularly interested in analyzing an alternative to current regulatory practice of prescribing access. In particular, we look at the possibility of restraining the input monopolist's market power by endowing downstream firms with a regulatory option: In case they disagree with the contracts proposed to them, downstream firms can claim a regulated access price. It turns out that this form of regulation may prevent foreclosure even though allowing for price discrimination in the intermediary market. It proves itself more beneficial to welfare than the current practice of prescribing access prices above marginal cost. Interestingly, even though one expects discrimination against the first mover, non-discriminatory input prices below cost can occur when the monopolist faces the alternative of a rather strictly cost-oriented regulated access price. Non-discrimination rules will either not become effective or result in less optimal price levels.
Subjects: 
price discrimination
vertical contracting
exclusion
regulatory outside option
JEL: 
D43
L13
L14
L42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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