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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorLevati, Maria Vittoriaen
dc.contributor.authorWeiland, Torstenen
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-25-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:42Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25649-
dc.description.abstractIn a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we distinguish different types of adaptations.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,048en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods gameen
dc.subject.keywordCheap talk communicationen
dc.subject.keywordReal-time protocolen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwInformationen
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleCheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn547461550en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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