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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25073
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Scholl, Almuth | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-05-29 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-23T14:43:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-23T14:43:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25073 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modelled as a limited enforceable contract. We define conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that the effectiveness of unconditional aid is low while self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the economy. However, increasing the welfare of the poor comes at high cost: to ensure aid effectiveness, less democratic political regimes receive permanently larger aid funds. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2005,054 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F35 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O19 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.title | Aid effectiveness and limited enforceable conditionality | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 512452091 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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