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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Mariotti, Marco | en |
dc.contributor.author | Manzini, Paola | en |
dc.contributor.author | Fella, Giulio | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:23:07Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:23:07Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21517 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x439 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J12 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | divorce | en |
dc.subject.keyword | non transferability | en |
dc.subject.stw | Eherecht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Familienökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Privater Transfer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Scheidung | en |
dc.title | Does Divorce Law Matter? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 845016660 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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