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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | van den Berg, Bernard | en |
dc.contributor.author | Hassink, Wolter H.J. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:21:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:21:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21308 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper tests empirically for ex-post moral hazard in a system based on demand-sidesubsidies. In the Netherlands, demand-side subsidies were introduced in 1996. Clientsreceive a cash benefit to purchase the type of home care (housework, personal care, supportwith mobility, organisational tasks or social support) they need from the care supplier of theirchoice (private care provider, regular care agency, commercial care agency or paid informalcare provider). Furthermore, they negotiate with the care supplier about price and quantity.Our main findings are the following. 1) The component of the cash benefit a client has noresidual claimant on, has a positive impact on the price of care. 2) In contrast, thecomponents of the cash benefit a client has residual claimant on, have no or a negativeimpact on the price of care. Both results point at the existence of ex-post moral hazard in asystem of demand-side subsidies. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1532 | en |
dc.subject.jel | I10 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | long-term care | en |
dc.subject.keyword | cash benefits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | consumer directed services | en |
dc.subject.keyword | demand-side subsidies | en |
dc.subject.keyword | direct payments | en |
dc.subject.keyword | moral hazard | en |
dc.title | Moral Hazard and Cash Benefits in Long-Term Home Care | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 483135631 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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