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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Albrecht, James | en |
dc.contributor.author | van Ours, Jan C. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:20:49Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:20:49Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21259 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers useeducation as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less isotherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lowereducational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, sowe conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x399 | en |
dc.subject.jel | I20 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Recruitment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | signaling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Personalbeschaffung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Qualifikation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Signalling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schätzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Niederlande | en |
dc.title | Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 844742430 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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