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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Earle, John S. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sabirianova, Klara Z. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:18:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:18:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21040 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We present a model of wage contract violation that implies a possibility of multiple equilibria inthe level of arrears. Positive feedback arises because each employer's arrears affect the costsof late payment faced by other employers operating in the same labor market, resulting in anetwork externality or strategic complementarity in the adoption of the practice. We study thecase of three equilibria, distinguishing two that are stable: the "punctual payment equilibrium"and the "late payment equilibrium." Our econometric analysis of linked employer-employee datafor Russia supports the model's contention that the firm's costs of wage arrears – as embodiedin worker effort, quit and strike behavior, and the probability of legal penalties – are attenuatedby arrears in the local labor market. We estimate the arrears reaction function implied by themodel, showing that it exhibits strongly positive feedback, and that the theoretical conditions formultiple equilibria under symmetric local labor market competition are satisfied in 1995 and1998. Simulation results imply a late payment equilibrium characterized by six monthly overduewages for a typical worker in 1995 and nine in 1998. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x196 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J30 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O17 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P31 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Wage arrears | en |
dc.subject.keyword | contractual failure | en |
dc.subject.keyword | institutions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | institutional lock-in | en |
dc.subject.keyword | social interactions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Russia | en |
dc.subject.keyword | transition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohn | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verbindlichkeiten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Hysteresis | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohntheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmarkttheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Soziale Beziehungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Betrieblicher Konflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Übergangswirtschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schätzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Russland | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnrückstände | en |
dc.subject.stw | wage arrears | en |
dc.title | Equilibrium Wage Arrears: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Institutional Lock-In | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 835458792 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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