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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
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dc.contributor.author | Bargain, Olivier | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:16:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:16:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20740 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we analyze the impact of a tax policy change on social welfare by using jointly acollective model of household labor supply and a microsimulation program of the French taxbenefitsystem. The collective approach allows studying the intrahousehold distribution sothat for the first time, social welfare can be characterized using individual utilities rather thanan ambiguous concept of household welfare. This way, the planner?s preferences addressnot only inter-household inequalities but also intra-household inequalities often neglected inthe literature. The other contribution of the paper derives from a larger interpretation of laborsupply behaviors which represent more than the simple work duration and incorporateunobserved dimensions related to effort or intensity at work. We simulate an extendedversion of the British Working Family Tax Credit on married couples in France. Two types ofconclusions emerge. First, the reform is not desirable for low values (utilitarian) or highvalues (rawlsian) of the social inequality aversion but rather for an intermediary range. Ineffect, on the efficiency side, the reform induces strong disincentive effects on theparticipation of second-earners while on the equity side, it does not specifically target thepoorest households. Second, we show that the choice of unit – household or individual – strongly condition the results of the normative analysis when departing in a reasonable wayfrom the assumption of equal sharing within the household. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1441 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H31 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D31 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J22 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D13 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collective model | en |
dc.subject.keyword | intrahousehold distribution | en |
dc.subject.keyword | social welfare | en |
dc.subject.keyword | household labor supply | en |
dc.subject.keyword | microsimulation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tax reform | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuersystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sozialtransfer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Haushaltsökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerreform | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Frankreich | en |
dc.title | Normative Evaluation of Tax Policies : From Households to Individuals | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477772072 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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