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dc.contributor.authorHagedorn, Marcusen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:15:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:15:40Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20647-
dc.description.abstractThis paper adds to the current literature on incomplete contracting that argues that deviating from a complete information, transaction-cost free environment may be may generate valuable insights. We achieve this by assuming bargaining with asymmetric information. We consider the consequences of asymmetric information for investment decisions and for the assignment of property rights. This analysis is crucial since any foundation must ensure that results of the kind derived by Grossman, Hart and Moore still hold. It is shown that investment incentives are guided by an additional element to standard hold-up models since the outcome of bargaining depends directly on the investment level. This may for example result in cooperative overinvestment. Although investment incentives are always positive from a social perspective, they can be negative from an individual's perspective. In our model, property rights are shown to still play a role. This arises from their tight interaction with ex-post bargaining. Optimal ownership structures are characterized and a new role for option contracts is identified.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x690en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordprivate valuesen
dc.subject.keywordownershipen
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen
dc.subject.keywordhold-upen
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Investitionspolitiken
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechtstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleContracting with Private Information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn362044813en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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