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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20600
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Koch, Alexander K. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Peyrache, Eloïc | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:15:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:15:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20600 | - |
dc.description.abstract | An essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent'stype. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such exante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his futureproductivity. By implementing effort in mixed strategies the principal can endogenouslyinduce uncertainty about the agent's ex post productivity and generate reputationalincentives. Our main result is that creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal,even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This findingdemonstrates the importance of mixed strategies in contracting environments with imperfectcommitment, which contrasts with standard agency models where implementing mixedstrategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies are also implementable. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1331 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D80 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentive contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | reputation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | mixed strategies | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Prestige | en |
dc.subject.stw | Karriereplanung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Mixed Up? : That's Good for Motivation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 474213412 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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